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Abstract 
A recurrent debate in the IS field has been whether or not IS research should be pluralistic. 
That is, whether many different forms of research should be allowed, or perhaps even 
encouraged.  This paper presents a review of the literature on pluralism in IS research 
and analyses the different dimensions and types of pluralism that they adopt. A number 
of positions towards pluralism in the IS literature are identified and critically assessed. 
A common theme in this literature is an assumption that different approaches to IS 
research can be reconciled or even integrated.  This is seen as necessary for the credibility 
of the discipline and to avoid a ruinous decline into relativism.  Recent work in the history 
and philosophy of science, however, has questioned the view that research is, or should 
be, convergent in this way and offers a more expansive and potentially generative view 
of pluralism that will be explored in this paper. An argument for “Active Realism” is 
presented and its implications for IS research discussed. 
Keywords:  IS Research, Pluralism, Research approach, Active Realism 
Introduction 
A recurrent, if intermittent, debate in the IS field has been whether or not IS research should be pluralistic. 
That is, whether many different forms of research should be allowed, or perhaps even encouraged. The 
alternative being monism, which proposes that there is, or could be, one right way to do IS research. The 
initial monism of the field may, over time, have given way to a de facto pluralism (to the dismay of some IS 
scholars), but the implications of this diversity have not always been given sufficient attention. Rather, 
different streams of research have typically proceeded according to their own internal principles, largely 
without consideration of how they relate to each other. For proponents of strong relativism who would “let 
a thousand flowers bloom”, this situation is unproblematic, indeed arguably inevitable. For most 
commentators on pluralism in the IS field, however, it is seen as a threat to the standing of IS research and, 
as a consequence, there have been a number of efforts to find ways to manage this diversity. An important 
strand of this response for many commentators has been to seek to demonstrate that different research 
approaches can be reconciled or even integrated. Recent work in the history and philosophy of science, 
however, has questioned the view that research is, or should be, convergent in this way and offers a more 
expansive and potentially generative view of pluralism that will be explored in this paper.  
To set the scene for this discussion, this paper therefore first presents a review of the history of debates on 
pluralism in the IS field and analyses the different dimensions and types of pluralism that they adopt. A 
number of positions towards pluralism in the IS literature are identified and critically assessed. An 
argument for “Active Realism” (Chang, 2012) is then presented and its implications for IS research 
discussed.  
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A brief history of pluralism in the IS field 
The following review of pluralism in the IS field is based on an analysis of all papers in the AIS “basket of 
eight” journals, accessed through ABI/Inform (Proquest) and EBSCO (Business Source Ultimate), that had 
the word pluralism anywhere in the text. Papers referring to political or cultural pluralism were excluded 
from the analysis, as were papers that only mentioned the term in passing or where the term was only found 
in the reference list, without any substantive discussion of pluralism in relation to research. At the same 
time, the search was expanded to include additional papers in journals and conference proceedings that 
were identified in the “basket of eight papers” as influential in debates on pluralism. This yielded a total of 
105 papers from 22 journals, and 2 conference series over the period from 1985 to 2018. The number of 
papers per year varied from 0 in 1986 to 12 in 2004, but with no clear trend over time. 
In an early, and influential, paper on pluralism in IS research Landry and Banville (1992) argued that the 
emergence of the IS field, initially as a branch of applied computer science, was associated with the 
dominance of a monistic view of research, focused exclusively on the application of tools and strategies from 
the natural sciences. This was reinforced by editorial statements in leading journals, such as MIS Quarterly, 
asserting that “progress in information systems as a valid academic and professional discipline rests heavily 
on building a foundation of knowledge through painstaking scientific research” (Emery, 1989: xi). Emery 
characterised such work as presenting “well-defined hypotheses”, “unbiased and reproducible procedures 
for collecting evidence”,” and the collection of considerable quantitative data” from experiments and 
surveys that are subject to statistical analysis. While this view continued to be supported by IS researchers, 
generally adopting a positivist epistemology, who Landry and Banville (1992) termed “mainstream 
navigators”, it came under increasing challenge from others, that they termed “knights of change”. A 
significant contribution to these calls for pluralism in IS research is widely considered to be an IFIP 
Working Group Colloquium in Manchester, UK in September 1984 (Mumford et al, 1985). This included a 
number of papers arguing that the human and social dimensions of IS required the adoption of new tools 
and strategies from the humanities and social research.  
Consistent with Banville and Landry’s earlier identification of the IS field as a “fragmented adhocracy” 
(Banville and Landry, 1989), with weak barriers to entry, and low levels of coordination and 
interdependence, these alternative approaches to IS research were able to establish themselves, at first in 
separate journals and conferences, but fairly soon in mainstream literature too. Thus, just four years after 
the earlier editorial, MIS Quarterly, while acknowledging its traditional emphasis on positivist research 
methods and continuing commitment to hypothesis testing and quantitative data analysis, also welcomed 
papers adopting interpretive and integrated approaches (DeSanctis, 1993) 
Already in 1992, however, Landry and Banville had identified resistance to pluralism from researchers that 
they termed “unity advocates”, who saw diversity as a threat to the vitality and credibility of the still nascent 
discipline. Farhoomand (1987: 55), for example, argued that “what has mainly hampered scientific progress 
in the [IS] field is the lack of substantive ideology”. This argument was supported by Benbasat and Weber 
(1996: 397) who stated that “we run the risk therefore that diversity will become the miasma that spells the 
demise of our discipline” and called for diversity to be “controlled” and “managed”. Farhoomand and Drury 
(2001) went further in calling for a moratorium on theoretical diversity and the establishment of a focused 
and cumulative tradition. 
This view was challenged at the time by Robey (1996) who made a case for the promise of pluralism. 
Diversity, he proposed: expands the foundation on which knowledge claims in the field are based; attracts 
good people to the IS field; fosters creativity; and advances the valued principle of academic freedom. “Like 
it or not”, he argued (Robey, 1996: 400), “IS research will continue to diversify”. Support for this position 
came too from other researchers, particularly it was suggested, from Europe (Fitzgerald, et al, 1985), where 
the editors of the European Journal of Information Systems declared that it “has been at the forefront of 
pluralism” (O’Keefe and Paul, 2000: 1). Hirschheim and Klein (2003: 246), went further in suggesting that 
diversity was “widely accepted as one of the defining characteristics of the [IS] field.”  
Developments in the IS field since the mid 90s would largely seem to have borne out the prediction of Robey 
(1996) regarding continuing diversity, although this has not always been universally welcomed. Somers 
(2010), for example, writes that “the pluralism and associated debate within IS is an indulgence that, at 
some point, is going to become too expensive”. Nevertheless, mainstream attitudes towards pluralism 
would appear to have softened. A 2013 editorial in MIS Quarterly, for example, asserted that “having this 
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multi-pluralism of paradigms, methods, and methodologies is necessary and healthy” (Goes, 2013: iii), 
while a recent editorial in Information Systems Research promoted the blending of theories and methods 
within and across research paradigms (Rai, 2018). 
These discussions have predominantly been concerned with pluralism at the field level, that is with diversity 
within IS research as a whole, between different studies that themselves adopt a single approach.  A smaller 
number of papers go further, however, in advocating pluralism within studies.  That is promoting the use 
of more than one approach within the same study, potentially by a single researcher.  Accordingly, the 
primary focus of this paper will be the field level.  Consideration will also be given, however, to pluralism 
within studies where the literature discusses this (typically with respect to methodology, although, as will 
be shown, this is just one type of pluralism found in the field).  
Promoting pluralism 
Within the general pattern of shifting attitudes towards pluralism in the field, there have been a number of 
papers that have sought to make the case for within study pluralism more directly. Early examples of this 
type include Kaplan and Duchon (1988), Lee (1991) and Gable (1993). Drawing on their experience of 
gathering qualitative interview and observational data and quantitative survey data in a study of the 
introduction of an IS in nine clinical laboratories within a University Medical Centre, Kaplan and Duchon 
(1988) argued that mixing methods can identify potential analytical errors and omissions and lead to new 
insights and modes of analysis. More formally, Lee (1991) sought to refute the alleged incommensurability 
of positivist and interpretive approaches. Arguing that they are mutually supportive, he presented a 
framework for integrating the two. Similar to Kaplan and Duchon (1988), Gable (1993) identified the 
benefits of combining case studies and survey research. These were seen to include: providing detailed 
insights that can assist in the interpretation of quantitative findings; enabling triangulation; and as a test 
of contextual relevance. 
In terms of citation counts, one of the most influential papers promoting pluralism in IS research is 
probably that by Mingers (2001), who argues that multimethod research, combining methods across 
paradigms whether within a single study or across different studies, will deliver richer and more reliable 
research results. Two main arguments are put forward for this position. The first, in line with the stratified 
and differentiated ontology of Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1994), sees different paradigms as focusing on 
different aspects of reality, so that their combination is necessary to “deal effectively with the full richness 
of the real world” (Mingers, 2001: 243). The second argument proposes that the utility of different methods 
varies in particular phases of the research process and that combined methods can play to these different 
strengths. In passing, Mingers also refers to other advantages such as triangulation, creativity and 
expansion (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Similar support for mixed methods was also offered by Agerfalk 
(2013) in an editorial on pluralism in the European Journal of Information Systems. 
Having made this case, Mingers subsequently sought to analyse and account for the low level of 
multimethodological research in the IS field (Mingers, 2003). Even including papers that just combined 
different data-gathering methods (predominantly surveys, interviews and passive observation and 
secondary data), however, the proportion of multi-method papers was only about 20% with most of these 
being combinations either of qualitative methods, or of quantitative methods. Studies combining both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were significantly less common. This pattern was found even more 
strongly by Venkatesh et al (2013) who reported only about 3% of IS papers they analysed as employing 
mixed methods (defined as the sequential, or concurrent, combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods within a single study).  
Over time, therefore, there have been repeated calls for pluralism and for the adoption of mixed methods 
and paradigms in the IS field, endorsed and illustrated with exemplar studies in leading journals. Yet, 
somehow this would not appear to have been translated into any significant change in research practice. 
Mingers (2001, 2003) attributes the low uptake of mixed methods research to a number of philosophical, 
cultural, cognitive and practical barriers, including paradigm incommensurability and publication and 
research evaluation regimes, but argues that none of these are insurmountable and that “the attractiveness 
of multimethod research, in terms of the richness and increased validity of the results, will work in its favour 
in the long run” (Mingers, 2003: 249). Despite the emergence of a few specialist journals of mixed methods 
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research, however, this potential would seem yet to be realized (at least in terms of papers published in IS 
journals). The analysis in this paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of possible reasons for this. 
The plurality of pluralism 
Table 1 summarises the terms employed by the authors of the 105 papers to describe the types of pluralism 
in the IS field that they are concerned with.  As this clearly shows, pluralism is conceived in a variety of ways 
in the IS literature.  Thus, in some papers, pluralism is discussed predominantly in terms of data 
(quantitative or qualitative). Others refer to methodological, theoretical, paradigmatic (or sometimes more 
specifically, epistemological or ontological) pluralism, or focus on pluralism of research themes or topics. 
From Table 1 it can also be seen that individual papers frequently refer to more than one type of pluralism 
(so the total number of papers in Table 1 is greater than 105). 
This inconsistency hampers debate about pluralism because it potentially conflates very different types, 
treating them all as equivalent and assuming that claims made in relation to one can be applied 
unproblematically to all. Whether a study uses numbers or words to describe the phenomena being 
investigated, for example, carries no particular significance if there is a shared understanding of what those 
data are seen as representing. Thus, a research participant’s rating of the ease of navigation of a website as 
7 on a 1-7 Likert scale, might reasonably be considered to be equivalent to their reporting that the site was 
“very easy to use” in an interview. On the other hand, either words or numbers could be considered either 
as reporting an objective truth about a phenomenon, or as reflecting a person’s contingent and subjective 
judgement. Combining data gathered with one assumption with data gathered with the other may be 
considered as giving rise to incompatibility, if not incommensurability. These concerns are expressed more 
forcibly where pluralism is seen to involve paradigms or directly relates to philosophical assumptions. 
Other types of pluralism, of theories or of research topics, however, might be viewed as signs of healthy 
diversity, especially given organisations’ continuing exposure to technological innovation. It is unclear that 
one or a small number of theories should be expected to be sufficient to address such a dynamic context or 
that the field should restrict itself to a particular set of topics for all time.  
As can be seen from Table 1, methodological pluralism is the term most frequently used to describe IS 
research pluralism in the reviewed papers. This does not necessarily mean, however, that papers using this 
term understand methodological pluralism in the same way. For some, it refers to the use of quantitative 
and qualitative data in the same study (Wei, 2012) for others e.g. Mingers (2003) to the use of particular 
data-gathering techniques (e.g. surveys, interviews, experiments), while yet others would associate 
methods with particular paradigms (e.g.Goles and Hirschheim, 2000), giving methodological pluralism a 
necessarily philosophical dimension.  
This confusion is not unique to the IS field. Thus, Buchanan and Bryman (2009: xxviii) note in relation to 
research methods textbooks: “many commentators use the terms methodology, design, strategy and 
methods synonymously, inclusively … and often without precise definition”. One response to this situation, 
that Buchanan and Bryman espouse, would be to adopt what may be regarded as a minimum definition of 
methods, restricting it to “a tool or technique or approach for collecting data” Buchanan and Bryman (2009: 
xxvii). While this would have the virtue of simplicity, however, it would be inconsistent with much of the IS 
literature on pluralism and avoids some of the key controversies on pluralism in the field.  
In practice, therefore, the types referred to in Table 1 are far from mutually exclusive, nor are they 
necessarily collectively exhaustive, although this, in itself may be considered evidence of the field’s 
pluralism and of the absence of mechanisms to promote, or enforce, standard definitions. To the extent, 
however, that these constitute the range of dimensions used by IS scholars to describe the pluralism in the 
field, they may nevertheless be seen as indicative of the types of diversity manifested in IS research. 
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Type of pluralism Number of papers 
Data 11 
Epistemology 10 
Method 76 
Ontology 4 
Paradigm 31 
Theory 12 
Topics 7 
 
Table 1: Types of pluralism discussed in reviewed papers 
If Table 1 describes the dimensions of IS pluralism, how IS studies differ from one another, this is only part 
of the story. A further issue in relation to pluralism concerns how studies that differ from each other on 
particular dimensions relate to each other. This has been addressed in various ways in the IS literature.  
As the discussion of the history of pluralism above indicates, one response to diversity has been to try to 
suppress it and to argue for methodological monism, either on the grounds that there is only one valid way 
to conduct research and that other approaches are therefore illegitimate, as argued by Farhoomand and 
Drury (2001) or on the pragmatic grounds that, as Benbasat and Weber (1996) argued, it will be in the best 
interests of the field to focus on a single approach, even if there may be good arguments for other 
approaches. These positions may be termed monistic naturalism (for its commitment to the methods of the 
natural sciences) and normative monism (for its pursuit of a single approved approach to research for the 
field). 
The alternative to monism, however, is not just a general pluralism. Rather several different pluralist 
positions on the relationship between different research approaches may be distinguished. One way in 
which these positions vary, is between those that propose that differences between positions can be 
reconciled and others that see them as only coexisting, without necessarily any common understanding. In 
terms of the first, convergentist, positions, we may further distinguish between convergence through 
commensurability, and convergence through a shared reality.  
The argument for commensurability proposes that there is a common material reality against which 
different understandings can be tested. Particular positions may be incompatible, but, in time, false 
understandings will be eliminated, and a shared, true understanding will be able to emerge. Triangulation, 
as discussed by Gallivan (1997), whereby findings from one research method are used to validate the 
findings from another, may be taken as one expression of this position.  
A less direct form of reconciliation is discussed by Mingers (2001) who argues that different paradigms 
(with their associated methods) may address phenomena differently, but that reality is such as to 
accommodate these alternative perspectives. Truth is seen to transcend its many different formulations. In 
terms of the parable of the blind men and the elephant which is sometimes used to explain this position, 
there is a real elephant, even if different researchers’ appreciation of it varies significantly depending on 
whether they have encountered the ear, the tail or the trunk.  
Two alternative approaches that question reconciliation, but argue that different approaches can coexist, 
may similarly be identified. The first of these argues that understanding of the world is shaped by individual 
experience and this will always vary from person to person. There is therefore no necessary commonality 
between understandings, as each researcher will see the world in their own way. Each researcher, from this 
perspective, encounters their own version of an elephant that may be nothing like anybody else’s. Such a 
view implies a form of strong relativism that is often associated with Feyerabend (1975). While this position 
is rarely adopted in the IS literature, indeed several of the reviewed papers are at pains to dissociate 
themselves from it, it has recently received some support from Treiblmaier (2018). 
The second approach associated with coexistence also problematises the idea of a unitary reality, even of 
the differentiated Critical Realist type that Mingers (2001) and Zachariadis et al (2013) argue is able to 
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reconcile pluralist perspectives. Unlike the relativist, however, different methods are seen as sharing 
common principles of reason that enable some degree of mutual intelligibility. Researchers can employ a 
common language to describe their experience of their elephant, therefore, even if they are not necessarily 
describing something they have in common. A version of this position may be seen in the call by Landry 
and Banville (1992) for a “disciplined methodogical pluralism” that would require proponents of new 
research propositions to apply a systematic evaluatory framework to their claims. This, Landry and Banville 
(1992: 94) argue, would “have the general advantage of substantially improving the communication process 
within the field of MIS” and “force a quicker elimination of untenable research proposals”. 
Following Watson (1990) these positions may be termed, respectively, pluralism of hypotheses, 
methodological pluralism, perspectival pluralism and archic pluralism. Prior discussions of pluralism have 
arrived at similar categories. Thus, Klein et al (1991) refer to proponents of monistic naturalism as 
supremacists and describe proponents of something similar to pluralism of hypotheses as advocates of 
contingency. They reserve the term pluralists, however, for perspectival pluralists, which would seem to 
deny the pluralism of other approaches, although they acknowledge that, in practice, other positions which 
they describe as eclecticism and radical contingency are quite similar to what they describe as pluralism. 
An alternative categorisation is offered by Fitzgerald and Howcroft who distinguish between supremacism 
(which covers monism of both varieties), isolationism (akin to perspectival pluralism), integrationism 
(which, like pluralism of hypotheses, seeks to combine alternative approaches into a single coherent mode 
of analysis, although they include Landry & Banville under this heading) and pluralism (which would seem 
to combine Klein et al’s eclecticism and Watson’s methodological pluralism). Given the inconsistencies 
within and between these various typologies, Watson’s terminology will therefore be adopted for this paper, 
as it offers the most clear-cut distinctions that can be applied to views of pluralism in the IS literature. 
Watson’s categories are extended, however, to include the two variants of monism that have been advanced 
in debates on pluralism in the IS field, as shown in Table 2.  
 
 Reality Epistemology Methods Example from the IS literature 
Monistic 
naturalism 
Unitary Unitary One right way Farhoomand (1987) 
Normative 
monism 
Unitary Unitary One best way Benbasat and Weber (1996) 
Pluralism of 
hypotheses 
Unitary Plural and 
compatible 
Address a 
common reality 
Gable (1994) 
Methodological 
pluralism 
Unitary Plural, but 
partial  
Offer partial 
perspectives on 
shared reality 
Mingers (2001) 
Perspectival 
pluralism 
Plural Plural and 
incompatible 
Anything goes Treiblmaier (2018) 
Archic pluralism Plural Plural, but 
mutually 
intelligible 
Disciplined 
pluralism 
Landry and Banville (1992) 
 
Table 2: Alternative positions on pluralism 
In terms of the debates in the IS literature, each of these positions may be seen to offer a different response 
to the existence of pluralism in the field. Each of them, however, also raises potentially significant 
challenges in addressing the existence of pluralism. Thus, the appeal of monistic naturalism lies in its 
alignment of IS research with the high status of the natural sciences, its promotion of a consistent set of 
methodological principles, its pursuit of a cumulative and progressive programme of research and its 
provision of clear and strongly-backed validity criteria for evaluation. Were it to be adopted as a solution to 
pluralism in the IS field, however, it would require the exclusion and/or suppression of long-standing 
traditions of IS research that conceive of information systems as fundamentally social, rather than just 
technological, systems (Hirschheim 1985), that, it is argued, are not adequately addressed by the “standard 
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scientific model.” Nor, as debates in the sociology and philosophy of science illustrate, is this standard 
model necessarily as monolithic as its proponents suggest.  
The case for normative monism is generally made by reference to the threat that diversity poses to the 
recognition of IS as a distinct academic discipline and the effects this will have for the “funding levels, 
publication productivity, and political influence” (Benbasat and Weber, 1996: 393) of the field. Drawing on 
the argument made by Pfeffer (1993) on the weakness of organizational science as a research field compared 
to economics, it is argued that without adherence to an agreed corpus of topics, theories and methods, the 
IS field is at risk of hostile takeover by more cohesive and rigorous disciplines. While acknowledging that 
diversity brings some benefits, the call is made for it be curtailed for the greater good of the field.  
Despite claims by advocates of pluralism that publication practices in the IS field have tended to suppress 
diversity (e.g. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004), however, these appeals for greater unity in the field would not 
appear to have been particularly successful in their attempt to “convince or cajole … colleagues about the 
direction the field should pursue” (Benbasat and Weber, 1996: 398). Although, in part, this may reflect the 
emergence of journals receptive to alternative perspectives and possible differences in attitudes to pluralism 
in the European and North American IS communities, it would also appear that the unitarist rhetoric 
(forcefully analysed in Van Maanen’s (1995) responses to Pfeffer) has been insufficiently persuasive. Nor 
would there seem to be institutional mechanisms within the field that could enforce any move towards 
monism. 
If monism is considered to be unachievable then perhaps the best that can be hoped for is some form of 
managed pluralism. As has been discussed, there are several variants of this that reflect different views of 
whether, and if so how, alternative research approaches may be reconciled. Arguments for reconciliation 
highlight several reasons for pursuing such a course. Venkatesh et al (2013), for example, identify seven 
purposes for the adoption of mixed methods that they refer to as complementarity (blending methods to 
gain complementary views of the same phenomena or relationships), completeness (ensuring a complete 
picture of the phenomenon), developmental (one method gives rise to questions that are addressed by 
another), expansion (explaining or expanding on the understanding from another method), 
corroboration/confirmation (assessing the credibility of inferences from another method), compensation 
(compensating for weaknesses of another method) and diversity (seeking divergent views of a 
phenomenon). This list contains a mix of different claims that may help to distinguish between alternative 
positions on pluralism. 
Thus, complementarity, completeness, corroboration/confirmation and compensation may all be argued to 
share a view that different methods are commensurable. If a combination of methods is to fulfil any of these 
purposes the methods must share some common understanding of reality. Without this they will talk past 
each other and not achieve agreement. As has been noted, this is the logic of triangulation and of pluralism 
of hypotheses. Following Fielding (1986) and Blaikie (1991), however, it may be argued that this view relies 
on assumptions that are not necessarily universally shared.  
That this is the case, even with proponents of convergence, may be illustrated by the differences highlighted 
by Zachariadis et al (2013) in their view of the purposes of mixed methods identified by Venkatesh et al 
(2013). They point out, for example, that Critical Realist multimethod research would question whether 
statistical generalisations at the empirical level can “make meaningful connections with and validate the 
qualitative results … whose purpose is to identify active mechanisms” (Zachariadis et al, 2013: 864). In 
relaxing the assumption that methods share a common understanding, therefore, this methodological 
pluralism allows for greater eclecticism. It still retains an assumption, however, that the divergence of 
methods reflects their different views on a common, albeit complex and multidimensional reality, rather 
than because of any inconsistency between these views. Methods may not be directly complementary, 
compensatory or corroborative, but there is nevertheless the possibility of some degree of meaningful 
connection. 
Going one step further in relaxing these assumptions, archic pluralism locates the potential for connection 
solely in the realm of common processes of reason. Methods may not agree on how IS phenomena are to be 
understood, but they can communicate their differences and promote development, expansion and 
diversity through their interaction, albeit within the terms of their own understanding. Some loose form of 
complementarity and compensation, for example in relation to depth vs breadth of analysis, may also be 
possible. Expansion and diversity are also emphasized, although, for Robey (1996) this also brings with it 
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responsibilities: to be disciplined in the pursuit of individual methods; and to work towards collaboration 
across approaches in a spirit of tolerance and genuine appreciation of difference. The unanswered question 
hanging over such interactions, however, is how far the IS field constitutes a space of genuine dialogue 
(Bohm, 2003) in which assumptions are suspended and space opened up for creative reconceptualisation 
on both sides or whether appeals to pluralism are simply rhetorical (which, of course, also applies to 
exchanges in other forms of pluralism). 
Removing any requirement even for mutual intelligibility or communication we arrive at the most radical, 
perspectival, version of pluralism. Diversity is maximized, but no other correspondence between methods 
can be assumed. Such a stance it is suggested will foster progress and lead to new insights (Treiblmaeir, 
2018), although, for many in the IS field, at the cost of anarchy, a rejection of scientific method and a 
betrayal of the discipline’s pursuit of academic credibility. Indeed, this is sometimes the basis for rejection 
of any form of pluralism as any relaxation of monism is seen as inexorably leading to complete relativism. 
The contributions and challenges of each of the positions on pluralism in the IS field are summarized in 
Table 3. 
 
 Key contribution to pluralism 
debates 
Potential challenges in addressing de 
facto pluralism 
Monistic 
naturalism 
• Clearly demarcates scope and 
character of what counts as research  
• Assumes that there is only one type of valid 
research and that this is suitable to 
understand all phenomena 
Normative 
monism 
• Seeks to promote the legitimacy and 
coherence of IS research 
• No mechanism to exclude other approaches 
Pluralism of 
hypotheses 
• Provides grounds to choose between 
approaches 
• Assumes that these grounds are shared 
Methodological 
pluralism 
• Allows that different approaches 
may lead to different 
understandings 
• Assumes that the reality is such as to 
reconcile these understandings  
Perspectival 
pluralism 
• Allows maximum diversity of 
approaches 
• No common ground between different 
approaches 
Archic pluralism • Allows that different approaches 
may rely on incompatible 
assumptions 
• Mutual intelligibility may not be possible 
and may be insufficient to resolve 
differences 
 
Table 3: Contributions and challenges of alternative positions on pluralism 
Active Realism, an alternative view of pluralism 
The fears expressed in relation to pluralism, especially of a non-convergent variety, are often based on an 
appeal to “science” (normally assumed to be natural sciences, but also sometimes extended to psychology 
and, in some cases, the social sciences). Key features of science that it is feared that IS research will lose if 
pluralism is let loose include: realism; the pursuit of truth; progression on the basis of cumulative growth 
of knowledge; evidence of successful application and the achievement of disciplinary maturity. Recent work 
in the history and philosophy of science by Chang (2012), however, has raised questions about whether 
science does, or should, exhibit these features.  
Chang’s argument is developed in a book, provocatively entitled, Is Water H2O?: Evidence, Pluralism and 
Realism the main focus of which is a detailed account of how H2O came to be accepted as the chemical 
formula for water. This seeks to show that, rather than being immediately and incontrovertibly established 
at a precise moment, the shift in the understanding of water from it being seen as a primary element to a 
view of it as a chemical compound of a specific form was gradual and contested. Alternative theories, 
notably “phlogiston theory”, championed by the eminent scientist Joseph Priestley, offered empirically 
well-supported challenges to Lavoisier’s oxygen theory, the evidence and arguments for which were seen as 
 Beyond Convergence: Rethinking Pluralism in IS Research 
 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 9 
far from incontrovertible at the time. The lack of conclusive evidence to rule out phlogiston theory, Chang 
(2012: xvii) puts down to “genuine methodological incommensurability”. 
There is not the space in this paper to rehearse the details of Chang’s case, especially as some of these are 
contested by Kusch (2015). For the purposes of this paper, however, there are two aspects of Chang’s 
argument that would seem relevant to the debate on pluralism in the IS field. The first is the evidence that 
it provides, suggesting that progress, even in the natural sciences may be less clear cut and linear than it 
tends to be portrayed in the IS literature and secondly, and more importantly, is the doctrine of “Active 
Scientific Realism” that Chang develops from it. 
Questioning the standard model of scientific progress 
Representations of scientific progress in the IS literature have long been contested, often on the basis of 
disputed readings of Kuhn’s concept of scientific paradigms. Whether or not particular interpretations of 
Kuhn have been true to the original (Hassan & Mingers, 2018), four types of implications are generally 
drawn from the concept. First is that the advancement of knowledge is punctuated, with extended periods 
of normal science being sporadically overturned by new paradigms that fairly rapidly establish themselves 
as the new orthodoxy. Second, that within periods of normal science knowledge advances on the basis of 
shared understandings. Third that the succession of paradigms is initiated by the emergence of anomalies 
within the established paradigm, and fourth, that the successor paradigm is able to resolve these anomalies 
and incorporate previous understandings.  
It is not clear, however, that this is a good description of how knowledge has grown in the IS field, which 
rather resembles the conditions described by Davis (2010) in relation to organization theory. Progress in 
organization theories, he argues, has been vitiated by limited debate between different schools of thought 
and the absence of decisive common tests that would allow choice between them. What cumulation of 
knowledge there may be, therefore occurs within silos rather than leading to field-level advance. Of 
particular relevance to IS perhaps Davis also argues that the premium placed on innovation in organizations 
creates conditions that challenge the pursuit of stable generalizations.  
If there is a poor fit between the evidence of progress in the IS field and the process associated with the 
standard scientific model, then perhaps it is rather in its adherence to the principles on which this model is 
based (and that were identified above as the bulwark against lawless pluralism) that the progress of IS 
research should be judged. Chang (2012) argues, however, that these do not constitute a viable source of 
guidance. Thus, the primary focus of this standard model is seen to be the pursuit of truth. That is, new 
theories and evidence are seen as enabling us to get closer to the truth about the way the world works, and 
old theories will be discarded because they are shown to be false. Chang argues, however, that the truth 
yielded by scientific research is contingent, rather than absolute. It amounts to a claim of correctness within 
a particular system of practice. Similarly, scientific investigation cannot hope to provide absolute certainty. 
Indeed, were that ever to be achieved it would mark the end of inquiry.  
Two further aspects of what is seen to be the standard scientific model that are invoked in debates on 
pluralism in the IS field are the arguments from success and from maturity. The first of these holds that 
evidence of the truth of science can be judged from its success. Yet success may have several meanings (such 
as empirical adequacy, explanatory power, or unifying power) and, in practice, it is always relative, never 
absolute. Inferring truth on the basis of such unreliable evidence, Chang argues, would therefore seem 
suspect. 
Furthermore, as Chang points out, in the course of history there will have been many theories which are 
now considered false that were considered successful in their day. Nor, on the same grounds, can we assume 
that the empirical success of current theories is necessarily indicative of their truth. This is the so-called 
“pessimistic induction”. Chang (2012: 226), however, argues that this should actually be grounds for 
optimism. “Instead of feeling depressed by the fact that success does not give us warrant for assuming that 
we are in possession of the truth, we should be thinking: how wonderful it is that we can be so successful 
without even knowing the truth!”.  
The argument from maturity tends to be adopted as a defence against the pessimistic induction, by claiming 
that the failure of earlier theories can be attributed to the immaturity of the fields that gave rise to them. 
This would seem particularly relevant to discussions of IS pluralism, given the field’s perennial anxiety 
about its maturity (Landry and Banville, 1992; Baskerville and Myers, 2002; Grover, 2012). Yet, there is no 
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reason to believe, Chang proposes, that the period of time that a field has been in existence has any 
necessary relationship with the truth of its claims. A new field might come upon truths early in its career, 
but another might struggle indefinitely. Time itself would not seem enough to ensure that the outcomes 
associated with maturity will be achieved. Whatever maturity the IS field has, or has not, achieved gives no 
guidance on the truth status of the findings of IS research.  
If pluralism means the abandonment of claims that research can achieve truth or certainty or that the field 
can claim success or maturity, then concerns that it represents an abdication of reasonable standards of 
research practice may be understandable. With no firm grounds or direction for research, what is to prevent 
the inexorable slide into relativism? Does this not imply giving up on realism, on the belief that research 
aims to provide the truth about what the world is really like? 
Active Realism 
On the contrary, for Chang, realism is possible, indeed potentially strengthened, by pluralism Taking as his 
starting point a definition of reality as “whatever is not subject to our own will” (Chang, 2012: xix) he argues 
that knowledge is then “an ability to act without being frustrated by resistance from reality” (Chang, 2012: 
203). Research, Chang argues, should therefore strive to maximise our contact with reality so that we can 
learn from it.  
Rather than seeking to eliminate research approaches on the grounds that they fail to deliver truth (which, 
Chang argues, is in any case unachievable), or to preserve only those that have previously been considered 
successful (because, following the pessimistic induction, their successors may be expected eventually to fail 
too – a position he calls “conservationist pluralism”) we should encourage all approaches that are 
committed to engaging with reality. This engagement does not assume commensurability between 
approaches, but rather that each pursues correctness within their particular system of practice. For monists 
and convergent pluralists this may seem no different from relativism, but Chang argues that they are quite 
distinct. Thus, relativism renounces judgement and commitment, whereas pluralism actively pursues 
productive engagement between approaches. Pluralism is no less demanding of judgement, therefore, than 
monism or convergent pluralism, it just does not insist on one right answer. As Chang puts it, the slogan 
would be “many things go”, rather than “anything goes”.  
Chang’s pluralism is also active, in the sense that it encourages diversity rather than just accepting it. Rather 
than “the armchair pluralism of declaring “let a hundred flowers bloom””, Chang (2012: xx) argues, we 
should cultivate the 99 flowers that would normally be neglected. Such a position he recognises may 
provoke a number of concerns: that it would allow all sorts of crazy ideas to flourish; that it would lead to 
chaos and loss of focus; and that it would be too costly. Chang’s response is that pluralism does not mean 
that all ideas have be encouraged, but that it may be beneficial to promote more than one. Really crazy ideas 
will be eliminated by reality, but those that survive should be taken seriously, even if we disagree with them. 
Insistence on the incontestable truth of one position risks the exclusion of new thinking and potentially 
productive debate.  
While the diversity of a pluralist system may indeed be a distraction for some researchers, there is no 
requirement for individuals to pursue multiple approaches, as it is pluralism at the field level that is to be 
encouraged. Individual researchers should just not seek to prevent others from pursuing approaches that 
differ from their own. Similarly, the promotion of diversity inevitably carries some costs, but, Chang argues, 
these need not be prohibitive and have to be weighed against the opportunity costs of the foregone benefits 
of excluded alternatives. Nor is it necessary for all possible approaches to be pursued or for every approach 
to be equally funded. There can be rewards from keeping more than one option open.  
More broadly, an active pluralism is seen as bringing two types of benefits to a research field. One is the 
benefits of toleration, such as hedging the bet, division of domain, and satisfaction of different aims. The 
other, arguably more important, is the benefits of interaction. Such engagement between research 
approaches may be of three forms: integration, co-optation and competition. Integration of approaches, 
Chang suggests, may involve their ad hoc combination, although it is not clear how effective this will 
necessarily be in all circumstances.  
Co-optation, in which ideas and techniques from one approach are appropriated by another can occur, 
Chang proposes, even without meaningful communication between approaches and despite 
incommensurability. Thinking that has become narrowed by conventions of one approach may be unlocked 
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by the creative repurposing of elements of knowledge from another. Similarly, competition should seek to 
stimulate, rather than eliminate, alternative approaches.  
Chang therefore describes his position as “active normative epistemic pluralism”. It is active in being 
committed to the promotion of plurality, normative in proposing that this will benefit research practice, 
and epistemic, as opposed to metaphysical, in seeking to improve the way that knowledge is acquired, rather 
than to make claims about the nature of reality. 
What might Active Realism contribute to IS research? 
At first glance, Chang’s argument, based on evidence from developments in chemistry that occurred more 
than 150 years ago, would not seem an obvious source of insight for contemporary IS research, the 
continually evolving subject matter of which could, at the very least, be said to have a significant social 
dimension. The difference in timing and in the nature of the focal phenomena, however, arguably supports 
the case for pluralism. If the case can be sustained with respect to research on the objective physical 
properties of matter, then it should also be applicable to research on the more dynamic, indeterminate and 
social phenomena that are studied in IS research. The history of chemistry may therefore be considered as 
a hard, or extreme, case for the argument for pluralism. It also provides a corrective to assumptions in the 
IS literature that the natural sciences support arguments for monism. 
A more significant difference between Chang’s case and IS research is perhaps his focus on theory, rather 
than method. As has been observed, it is methodological pluralism that has been much more widely debated 
in the IS field. This difference, however, may reflect the relative (although far from absolute) methodological 
monism of chemistry at that time, where all parties employed experimental methods to obtain their findings 
and the dispute was about the theories that could best explain them. This did not preclude the use of 
different experimental apparatus and disagreements about what should be considered evidence and how 
this should be interpreted, but there was broad agreement on what the phenomena of interest were and 
how they should be investigated. In the IS field, in contrast, both what the phenomena of interest are and 
the appropriate methods to investigate them are contested.  
Nevertheless, the concern of research in both cases is to achieve knowledge about the phenomena of interest 
that does not simply reflect the researcher’s own understanding, that is, that, from Chang’s perspective, can 
survive an encounter with reality. This is the case whether “whatever is not subject to one’s own will” is a 
material process in the natural sciences or another researcher’s interpretation in a hermeneutic analysis. It 
is epistemic pluralism, in the way that knowledge is acquired, that Active Realism seeks to promote, rather 
than specifically theoretical or methodological pluralism. 
This promotion of pluralism is not just about proliferation for proliferation’s sake, but to improve 
knowledge acquisition through engagement between research approaches. Following Chang, we may 
consider various forms that this engagement might take. Turning first to toleration, the argument of 
hedging bets may be potentially less relevant in the IS field where research approaches are rarely in direct 
competition in seeking to explain a common, stable phenomenon. Even where there is a shared program of 
research, for example around the Technology Acceptance Model it is not clear that this takes a form whereby 
alternative methods (or theories) yield contrasting explanations of phenomena (Benbasat and Barki, 2007). 
More generally IS research would seem to resemble Organisation Theory, where, Davis (2010) argues, 
research approaches are distinguished more by the questions they ask rather than the answers they propose. 
As a result, there is no common basis for comparing approaches with each other. 
 There is some degree of division of domain in the IS field. Compare, for example, the many papers 
measuring effects of recommendations in online marketplaces with economic analyses of the efficiency of 
these markets. Groups of researchers approach a common topic from different angles. This would not seem 
to be the product of any particular commitment to pluralism, but rather of the IS field’s openness to multiple 
reference disciplines. There is little sense, moreover, that any such division of domain reflects any mutual 
agreement on the most effective way to advance knowledge in the field. 
There is a similar situation in relation to satisfaction of different aims. As Gregor (2006) argues, IS theories 
may be seen as pursuing four different goals: analysis, explanation, prediction and description. While some 
of Gregor’s types of theory address more than one of these, much IS research typically seeks to satisfy only 
one, without any necessary concern for the others. Again, however, this would seem to reflect the 
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fragmented character of the field rather than any coordinated effort to achieve complementary 
understanding. 
Toleration would therefore seem to be fairly well established in the IS field, although more because there is 
rarely much in common between the practices and concerns of different research approaches, than because 
there is any strong support for pluralism. So long as different strands of research are able to continue along 
their distinct paths, there is little cause for them to engage with each other.  
This does not mean that there is no tradition of interaction in the IS field. As has been noted, however, 
despite regular advocacy of the integration of research approaches in the IS literature and the publication 
of a number of papers presenting what they propose as exemplars of such integration, the adoption of multi-
method research in the field remains quite limited. Whether or not this is due to genuine 
incommensurability, or to cultural, cognitive, practical or institutional constraints is still the subject of 
debate. That the integration that does occur is predominantly of qualitative and quantitative data, where 
incommensurability is arguably less of an issue than with paradigm or epistemological integration (or, 
indeed, may be no issue at all), however, might suggest that, whatever the other constraints on mixing 
research approaches, incommensurability cannot be entirely ruled out.  
More generally, effective integration of approaches requires a degree of shared understanding of the 
phenomena of interest and the ways in which they may be understood. As has been argued, such 
convergence of perspective and practice is rare in the IS field. Perhaps, in time, new ways of transcending 
or reconciling the current fragmentation that will enable integration will emerge, but for the time being it 
seems unlikely to become commonplace. 
If full integration is likely to continue to be problematic therefore, perhaps there could be more scope for 
co-optation. In the IS field, however, co-optation, in the form of theory-borrowing, has largely occurred 
from reference disciplines rather than from other IS researchers (Grover and Lyytinen, 2015) and has often 
been seen as evidence of the immaturity and inferiority of IS research relative to more established subjects 
(Baskerville & Myers, 2002). Pluralistic intra-field co-optation may therefore avoid such concerns. It may 
also enable a less deferential approach to borrowing, where it may no longer be felt to be so necessary to 
advertise the fidelity of the appropriation. Rather, it might become possible to enable a proper 
acknowledgement and justification of the adaptations that the researcher has made to the original concepts 
to align them with the distinctive character of the new context in which they are deployed. As a consequence, 
more constructive debate may be possible on how concepts such as structuration (cf DeSanctis, and Poole, 
1994) or affordance (Zammuto, et al, 2007) have been treated in the IS literature, without any longer 
needing to insist that this has always been entirely consistent with their original formulation. 
Co-optation within the IS field may also be possible at a more disaggregated level, by which elements of one 
research approach are redeployed in another, with or without the awareness or approval of the source. 
These co-opted elements may include concepts, typologies and measures. In some domains this may be a 
well-established practice, for example where validated instruments to measure particular constructs, such 
as concern for information privacy (Smith et al, 1996), have been developed and are reused or adapted in 
other studies. The co-optation of such elements is likely to be easier where approaches share core 
assumptions, but the borrowing of elements can occur despite incommensurability. Consider, for example, 
the very different perspectives on knowledge management or knowledge sharing that might be associated 
with the various images of knowledge (embodied, embedded, embrained, encultured and encoded) 
discussed by Blackler (1995). Yet all might seek to address similar phenomena. 
Co-optation is primarily discussed here in terms of theoretical borrowing, but methodological co-optation 
is also possible. The extent to which methods can be deconstructed and recomposed with elements from 
other approaches, however, seems likely to be more limited than for theories, where individual concepts 
may perhaps be more easily lifted out from the network of assumptions and practices within which they 
were developed. This is not to say that this is actually the case, but the dependence of a concept on certain 
assumptions may be less evident than, say, the dependence of statistical methods of data analysis on the 
gathering of quantitative data. The scope for potential methodological co-optation may therefore be 
somewhat constrained, but it may still be beneficial to encourage researchers to consider the possibility of 
new combinations of elements of research methods (such as types of data, or data gathering or analysis 
methods), not least to avoid the unreflective treatment of methods as indivisible and incontestable 
conglomerations. Even if these new combinations are not ultimately considered to be viable, the debates 
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they provoke may challenge established methods to be clearer about (and provide a better rationale for) 
their assumptions. 
The challenge to competition between research approaches in the IS field lies not just in the general absence 
of common principles against which any contest could be decided, but also in the absence of incentives or 
mechanisms to enforce any decision. Perhaps, as Chen and Hirschheim (2004) argue, publication practices 
have some influence here, but they would seem incapable of suppressing any approach completely. Even 
were the institutional structures of the IS field more rigorous, as some might wish for, the argument for 
pluralism would view the competition between approaches as leading not to exclusion, but to co-existence 
and constructive disagreement. Thus, rather than seeking to delegitimise alternative approaches, as Mutch 
(2013) was seen to have done, for example, in describing sociomateriality as a “wrong turning”, it would 
seem more productive to encourage debate on those aspects of alternatives that are viewed as problematic 
(without insisting on the correctness of one’s own position). At the same time, it would be for proponents 
of alternative approaches to respond to these challenges and not to retreat into defensiveness. The 
expectation from such engagement would not necessarily be the resolution of differences, but a willingness 
to seek to address the concerns raised (insofar as this is possible from the alternative perspective). The 
response by Scott and Orlikowski (2013) appeals to such a pluralistic view, but, in that paper at least, does 
not take the next step of showing how this might be worked out. For example, to discuss directly why the 
criticism that sociomateriality shows “a lack of specificity about the material and a neglect of broader social 
structures” (Mutch, 2013: 31) is misplaced. 
What this exchange on sociomateriality also illustrates is perhaps an arguably more important implication 
of pluralism which relates to the attitude to one’s own and others’ knowledge. Chang (2012:238) identifies 
pluralism as seeking to promote “tolerance, humility and circumspection, combined with a tough 
questioning attitude” and argues that this should be considered a sign of maturity, both of individuals and 
of research communities. The essential humility of Active Realism, he proposes, comes from a recognition 
of the fallibility of the capabilities of any human knower and of the methods that they use. “We are limited 
beings” Chang (2012: 255) argues “trying to understand and engage with an external reality that seems 
vastly complex, apparently inexhaustible, and ultimately unpredictable”. Acknowledging this should not be 
cause for resignation at the impossibility of certain knowledge, but for the active pursuit of knowledge in 
the awareness of its fallibility.  
Such an attitude may also contribute positively to current debates about the lack of original theorising in IS 
research and the limitations of the field’s dominant epistemic scripts (Grover and Lyytinen, 2015). By 
freeing researchers from an expectation that research within the field should be cumulative and convergent 
it may be possible to allow, indeed support, the co-existence of programmes of research that may be based 
on very different assumptions. The concern then is not the elimination of “wrong moves”, but the stimulus 
to new thinking from the juxtaposition of difference.  
The positive contribution of such diversity to creativity has been widely identified (Kozbelt et al, 2010). 
They therefore argue for a pluralism in which “a multitude of theoretical perspectives, with different 
assumptions and methods, and operating at different levels of analysis, all (ideally) contribute to a more 
robust - if at times, contestable – understanding” (Kozbelt et al, 2010: 20). 
As they also note, however, diversity needs to be “in moderation”, if it is too great, engagement between 
perspectives will be lost. As important as diversity itself, therefore, are the conditions under which it is 
sought to be promoted. The principles of collaboration proposed by Robey (1996) of respect, responsibility, 
trust, honesty, commitment, empowerment, support, admiration, honor and celebration may provide a 
(perhaps, as Robey (1996:407) acknowledges, “shamelessly idealistic”) starting point for thinking about the 
qualities that this may demand of the IS community  
Rather than striving to make the IS field monolithic, narrowing its focus and the range of approved 
approaches, therefore, researchers need to be able to position their work within the broader theoretical and 
empirical landscape of the field, and to recognize, and if possible respond to, the challenges that alternative 
approaches offer to their assumptions and perspectives. While an attitude of humility towards one’s own 
views and respect towards others’ will be necessary if such engagement is to be positive, it cannot be 
presumed that this will lead to the identification of commonalities, let alone to any necessary convergence.  
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Conclusions  
Over time, pluralism in the IS field has been variously decried, tolerated and promoted. Underlying much 
of this debate, however, has been an assumption that different research approaches within the field are, or 
should be, capable of being reconciled. Without this convergence it is claimed, IS research: would be 
incapable of achieving the cumulative body of distinctive knowledge that is taken to be the hallmark of 
scientific progress; would fail to be recognised as a legitimate discipline; and, it is feared, would inevitably 
decline into relativism. This paper has drawn attention to the plurality within IS debates on pluralism that 
makes the issuing of definitive statements of its effects problematic. Different sorts of claims about the 
implications of pluralism may be appropriate in relation to data, for example, than in relation to 
epistemological pluralism. A more nuanced treatment of pluralism in the IS field would therefore seem 
desirable. As this paper has also sought to show, however, convergence is not a necessary condition for 
effective pluralism, either in science or, it is argued, in the IS field. Following recent work in the history and 
philosophy of science, a case is made for Active Realism that promotes non-convergent pluralism. 
Engagement is possible between research approaches, notwithstanding their potential incommensurability 
and various forms that this could take are discussed. Adopting such a stance, it is argued, would have the 
benefit of increasing awareness of diversity in the field and of the challenges this may pose to the 
assumptions and limitations of a researcher’s chosen research approach. An acceptance of non-convergent 
pluralism may also encourage greater tolerance of others’ approaches and humility with regard to our own 
knowledge. If we are no longer to eliminate approaches in search of the right answer, but are supportive of 
all approaches that seek to engage with reality, then this may offer a way to overcome the rigidity of 
conventions that are seen as stifling innovation in IS research. 
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